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 The aim of this article is to assess the influence of demographic age 
shares on changes in economic growth in the EU from 1996 to 2013 using a 
fixed effects model. The authors hypothesise the demographic variable 
having a statistically significant effect on the macroeconomic variable. 
Conclusions and suggestions stemming from the analysis are expected to 
benefit policymakers and provide guidance to public institutions.  
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Introduction: 
 With the onset of long-term transformations in the EU’s demographic 
makeup, the issue of their implications for the economy has become acute. 
The status quo maintaining an ageing population coupled with low birth rates 
and no signs of imminent change manifested itself in a conundrum that 
neither the private nor the public sector currently appears to have the 
capacity to solve. Discussions covering these socio-economic changes 
spanned from developed countries like the USA to emerging economies such 
as India and China. For developing nations, the connection between 
demographics and the economy served as a basis for forward-thinking policy 
changes while others conducted research to understand the aforementioned 
processes as they manifested. Their efforts resulted in an extensive debate 
regarding the value of savings, return caps and the demographic variables’ 
influence on the economy in general.  
 The EU context raises more questions due to previous studies being 
scarcer than those dedicated to the USA, specifically, on the relationship 
between GDP growth and demographic shifts.  
 The purpose of this research is to quantify the effects of processes 
such as the evolution of the age composition in the EU on economic growth 
and juxtapose estimation results with those obtained in comparable works. 
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This, in turn, forms a platform for insight to suggest areas necessitating 
remedial action. 
 This article consists of four parts: an overview of modern approaches 
to the relationship of demographic trends and the economy, the construction 
of the fixed effects model, and the assessment of the aforementioned trends’ 
effects on economic output. The last section outlines the conclusions derived 
from the research.  
 
Modern Approaches to the Relationship of Demographics and the 
Economy 
 Stacking predictable short-run changes in demographic makeup 
raises the question of the current framework’s longevity, considering 
retirement benefits, entitlements, returns on investment-based alternatives 
and economic development as a whole. Bloch (2011) argues all of the above 
will undergo an “asset meltdown” with cuts to reduce the amount of 
distributable welfare on every level from state-run schemes to investment 
funds. A Romanian study by Nadelea and State (2008, p. 1008-1012) 
contributes to the discussion by pointing out the costs of demographic 
transformations incurred by the consumer goods market. 
 Dizard (2013) seems to agree with the Bloch’s sentiment, as far as 
pointing out the same sectors to be affected by demographic changes. Dizard 
further contributes to the discussion with the addition of non-healthcare elder 
goods and services, providers of which will manage to alter their businesses 
in a timely manner to reap benefits from changes in demand. He predicts that 
due to life expectancy remaining on the increase, demographic 
transformations will reduce demand of youth-oriented consumer products 
and put pressure on stock valuations of related companies. Moreover, he 
expects gains of medical and care service providers to be modest due to 
restrictive government legislation and an increasing strain of public finances 
caused by the need to deliver the assumed amount of funding. Dizard 
introduces care homes as an example of a service in high demand that is not 
profitable enough for the private sector to fully satisfy the demand.  
 Jensen (2013) and Magnus (2008, 2010) offer a consensual valuation 
of the state of affairs, but their views on the downturn are muted. Magnus 
argues that regions experiencing the transition to low birth rates and low 
infant mortality rates such as Europe or Japan are home to global businesses 
able to provide stability thanks to income generated in emerging markets. 
Such enterprises are not expected to fall under the lower returns trend. 
Nonetheless, both authors admit a doubling old age dependency ratio is a 
problem the effects of which are largely unknown. As Magnus (2010, p. 1) 
puts it: “we actually have no template about what to expect because 21st 
century population aging is unique.“ Japan’s experience may be even more 
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unique for cultural reasons, but the implications of a lost generation 
happening in the EU deserve more attention than they currently get, Jensen 
(2013) concludes. Decle’s (2000) Japanese case study pointed to a temporary 
effect in the economy that lasted for ten years, where consumption levelled 
off instead of falling as the population aged. This was explained with savings 
made on fewer workforces being required along with reduced costs to equip 
it, leaving more funds available for consumption. 
 Macunovich (2010) uses examples from Latin America, Japan and 
the USA to explain that their economic downturns in the last 30 years were 
rooted in the countries’ demographic makeup. In the paper, he stresses the 
importance of the 15-24 age group rather than an increasing old age 
dependency ratio. He discovered that growing economic activity and GDP 
per capita correlated with an increase in the group’s relative weight while 
downturns occurred immediately after the period of the cohort’s peak size. 
This effect manifested itself in many countries across Europe, including 
Belgium, Sweden and Russia. Macunovich suggests examining the age 
structure as a polynomial to avoid omitting meaningful data, going as far as 
suggesting overestimating the number of degrees in the polynomial to begin 
with unbiased, if inefficient, estimates. However, he warns against 
combining countries with different types of age structures, as they indicate a 
different economic effect in the 65 and over age group due to the presence or 
absence of government aid schemes.  
 McKinsey Global Institute, the research arm of the McKinsey & 
Company management consultancy, presents a standardised approach 
towards polynomials as a representation of ageing effects in a publicised 
discussion on the upcoming demographic deficit. In their case study on 
Germany, Italy, the UK, and among non-EU countries, they have used fifth-
degree estimates of life cycle effects. The Institute details in the technical 
notes section: “in this type of synthetic panel specification, all trends in the 
data are captured by lifecycle and cohort effects. Linear time trends cannot 
be separately identified since age, time and cohort are linearly related. Any 
time effects are implicitly assumed to be orthogonal to the deterministic 
trends represented by age and cohort effects” (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2004, p. 224). 
 The IMF dedicated an issue of Finance and Development to the 
matter. Bloom and Canning (2006) pointed out the current state is a result of 
more than 100 years of deviation from a historic trend, in which populations 
and age structures changed very little. The “upheaval”, according to the 
authors, caused a wave of “booms, busts, and echoes” referring to baby 
boomers, the subsequent decline in fertility as they reach maturity and echo 
effects, maintaining that a generation’s influence manifests itself in waves.  
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 Regardless of the looped effect and overall population increases, the 
IMF’s contributors pointed out the total fertility rate dropped from 5 in 1950 
to approximately 2.5 in 2006, projected to fall further to 2 by 2050. As such, 
birth rates in developing countries are not expected to remain as high as they 
are now. However, they have also noted a drop in infant mortality, down to a 
third of its value of 180 since 1950 in developing countries and from 59 to 7 
in developed countries. This is accompanied by greater life expectancy 
worldwide, up by 15 years since 1950 to 65 in 2005. The increase has not 
been homogenous across the world, with disparity expected to rise due to 
AIDS hampering longevity in sub-Saharan Africa and failure to improve 
social infrastructure in certain Post-Soviet states (Bloom, 2006). 
 Challenges stemming from a large cohort entering retirement, 
provided behaviour is constant within age and sex groups, have potentially 
destructive consequences as described by Bloch. Conversely, his IMF paper 
notes a change in behaviour such as more women participating in the 
workforce or active immigration, as stated by Magnus, will resist the 
downward pressure on real income. Lacking such structural changes, public 
expenditures on pensions are to increase by as much as 16 p. p. of GDP by 
2050 in countries like Spain, more than twice of the projection made by the 
European Commission (Catalán, 2007). 
 Magnus (2010) and Bloch (2006) support their claim with the 
example of Ireland, the net migration rate of which has been negative since 
1960 until 1990, amounting to 1 per cent per annum on average (not 
dissimilar from Lithuania), but changed with the onset of economic growth 
fuelled by policy and demography-based factors. The increase in female 
labour force participation and immigrants, those returning and foreigners, 
dampened the negative effect predictions based purely on historic data.  
 A production technology model encompassing the demographic 
transition in China and India employed by Chamon (2006) sheds light on the 
subject of challenges in utilising the benefits of the demographic dividend. 
The log-linear model takes changes in demographic makeup and the 
economic transformation process as exogenous variables, meaning that 
certain tasks can only be done in countries deemed “developed”. It resulted 
in noteworthy conclusions, one of which was a development queue, allowing 
a certain country to develop only after a country ahead of it in the queue 
attains “developed” status. The authors also introduced criticality for long-
term transformations, maintaining a scenario will continue indefinitely as 
long as external processes keep the population’s demographic makeup above 
threshold. A country joining the developed world produces explosive 
growth; however, “transitions from the developing to the advanced economy 
group are rare“ (Chamon, 2006, p. 11). Trade barriers are pointed out as a 
potential demographic dividend reductor. While the authors warn about the 
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limitations of transferring regional experiences verbatim, they admit long-
term predictions with borderline values are sensitive to changes, some of 
which do not depend on action within the country because “the same policies 
that make a country unattractive to foreign investors today may not 
discourage them from investing in the future if that country becomes one of 
the last places in the world where labour is still ‘cheap’,” which makes the 
case for keeping data from developing and developed countries in separate 
subsets (Chamon, 2006, p. 13).  
 Batini et al (2006) used a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium 
four-country model to project the effects of demographic transformations as 
far as 80 years into the future. They have discovered the outcomes are differ 
between regions, with Japan undergoing the most extreme change in capital 
flows. Developed countries are expected to boost their developing 
counterparts’ growth over the next 20-30 years, exploiting their demographic 
dividends. Moreover, a rise in productivity by 0.1 per cent per year was 
projected as sufficient to offset half of Japan’s aggregate GDP’s fall 
attributed to demographic changes. The model inspected GDP per capita 
growth rates as well, concluding a decrease in industrialised nations due to 
ageing whilst those of developing countries are expected to increase as long 
as additional labour is used effectively. 
 With regards to policy and implementation, it is important to 
distinguish between cyclical and long-term structural changes. A simulation 
exercise run as part of the IMF Working Paper initiative underpinned capital 
export into developing Asia with demographic processes happening in 
Europe and Japan (Lueth, 2008). While there was speculation about capital 
flows in 2007 stemming from loose monetary policy, the author suggested 
that demographic change is behind the current, “making a sudden reversal 
less likely” (Lueth, 2008, p. 15).  Lueth makes it clear that ROI interests 
governments, which will be motivated to move from pay-as-you-go to 
investment-based schemes. He insists about processes such as globalisation 
and financial integration being beneficial in the long run, reassuring that the 
demographic transition may not cause a fall in returns as steep as others 
predict and he does not exclude the possibility of them increasing. 
 Arnott and Chaves (2012) present a development in the study of 
demographic variables as a determinant of economic shifts. The authors use 
a pool of 22 countries for the main regression and increase the number of 
degrees of freedom by force-fitting the equation into a two-to-four-degree 
polynomial. While a secondary regression with 176 countries is present in 
their study, the authors admit that data is fragmented, allowing for more 
accurate estimates only in developed countries. Their study involved a two-
fold set with GDP per capita being analysed in one regression and returns on 
securities in the other. Both sets depicted: “a strong and intuitive link 
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between demographic transitions and both GDP growth and capital market 
returns“ (Arnott, 2012, p. 23).  
 Insight taken from the works laid out in this part is used as a basis to 
formulate the methodology to be used in hypothesis testing. 
 
The Methodological Framework of the Econometric Model  
 The model’s basic premise entails the use of secondary time series 
data as reported in a sample of countries over a specified period. The data is 
panelised, labelling the demographic variable as the regressor and the 
economic variable as the regressand in a panel least squares single-equation 
regression. To capture valuation and business cycle effects, the equation 
contains a proxy economic variable on the regressor side. This may be seen 
in equation (1). 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑏1𝑠𝑡,1 + 𝑏2𝑠𝑡,2 + ⋯+ 𝑏𝑁𝑠𝑡,𝑁 + 𝜖𝑡,  (1) 
where 𝑟𝑡 – dependent variable at period t 
 a – intercept term 
 𝑋𝑡−1 – proxy variable, used to gauge the business cycle 
 𝑏𝑁 – coefficient for age group N  
 𝑠𝑡,𝑁 – relative population share size of age group N at period t. 
Note that the equation contains an intercept term, a lagged term for 
the valuation effect and denotes age shares for every cross-section in every 
period.  
 The main issue with equation (1) is that statistical data for most 
countries in a sufficiently large panel is available for a limited selection of 
years. As such, the number of data points is reduced, which complicates both 
analysis of the demographic variables’ slow evolution and its effect on the 
macroeconomic variable. In fact, estimating equation (1) directly is 
impossible for any country currently in the EU because including the 
intended number of five-year non-overlapping age groups (𝑠𝑡,𝑖) does not 
leave enough degrees of freedom, as i spans from 1 to 18, coinciding with 
the number of periods t. Excluding a particular age group, for example, ages 
0 to 4 or broadening the groups is an ad hoc solution that hides a part of the 
information contained in the original equation.  
 Hence, we may include a restriction for the number of coefficients: 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝐷0 + 𝐷1𝑖 + 𝐷1𝑖2 + ⋯+ 𝐷𝑘𝑖𝑘, (2) 
 This expression suggests replacing the coefficient 𝑏𝑖  next to every 
demographic share with a single polynomial of the order k, supposed to 
reduce the number of coefficients to estimate from N to k. The order of the 
polynomial is determined by testing it against redundancies with parsimony 
in mind via the Wald coefficient restriction test. It is worth noting that the i, 
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representing the number of the age group, spanning from 1 to N, is raised to 
the power from 0 to k.  
 Since demographic shares have the cumulative sum of unity and their 
sum of changes always equals to zero, a restriction is required on the 
transformed coefficients to avoid multicollinearity with the intercept term. 
The issue is captured by the initial term, 𝐷0 as described in equation (3). 
𝐷0 = − 1𝑁 (𝐷1 ∑ 𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝐷2 ∑ 𝑖2𝑁𝑖=1 + ⋯+ 𝐷𝑘 ∑ 𝑖𝑘𝑁𝑖=1 ), (3) 
 Following the coefficient transformation and after the inclusion of 𝐷0 
as shown in (3), the model’s regression equation intended for panel LS 
estimation appears as follows: 





�𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝑡, (4) 
 Note that to conserve space, the presented equation does not contain 
fixed effects, which determine the country-specific intercept term, supposed 
to capture differences between countries in the panel. Equation (4) with fixed 
effects is used for out-of-sample robustness tests while equation (1) presents 
the end result containing implied regression coefficients of every 
demographic share to be compared with those obtained in previous studies, if 
available, using this methodology. 
 The framework is put through a range of tests pertaining to the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions, its robustness and is subject to adaptation in 
case one of these assumptions is not met and the result may contribute to 
misleading conclusions.  
 As demonstrated in the first part of this paper, the variables and 
underlying data quality are crucial for BLUE estimation. Previously covered 
research limited to the USA theatre is mostly concerned with the former 
rather than the latter due to the relative legislative stability and availability of 
statistical data, allowing the researcher to focus on variable selection. The 
European context adds complexity factored by historical and methodological 
divisions, which affect the quality and availability of data and its variable 
forms. 
 Institutional changes are a noteworthy example, limiting the number 
of data points available for study in multiple countries to a period spanning 
from years after the collapse of the USSR until 2013. UN Penn World Tables 
provide estimates for the most general demographic and macroeconomic 
variables as well as official statistics with their quality classified accordingly. 
However, this data is limited to 5-year increments or 20 data points per 100 
years in addition to complementary variables necessary for hypothesis 
testing being absent from their repository. Hence, the European statistical 
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authority, Eurostat and the ECB act as the chief sources of data, providing 
demographic and macroeconomic time series used in this paper.  
 One of the key issues concerning the execution of the model was 
formulating the scope of detail to describe an EU member state’s 
demographic makeup. By referring to previous research and prior testing 
with draft models1, it was concluded that broad age groups withheld 
information present in the non-overlapping five-year cohorts reported by 
each member state. For countries such as France or Spain, these were 
published from 1948. For other countries, the series started from 1991 or 
1993, a case not limited to CEE countries like Lithuania or Slovakia.  
 Unlike in previously cited research, the number of groups was 18, not 
15, as Eurostat’s age groups were concluded by 85 and over instead of 75 
and over. Including all of the groups would have been impossible with the 
degrees of freedom available in an annual series from 1991 to 2013, 
excluding macroeconomic variables, were it not for the model’s 
transformation of demographic shares into a polynomial.  
 The analysis includes the levels of demographic shares, as observed 
on January 1st of the year (t) in question. While short-run effects may have 
potential utility, the slow rate of change makes annual data the more feasible 
alternative. Although distribution by sex is available, it is not analysed in the 
scope of this thesis, considering the aggregate nature of economic growth.  
 Annual percentage changes of real GDP (fixed prices, 2005 base) are 
used to represent the demographic makeup’s effect on the economy as the 
regressand. Following the literature review, it may be concluded that this is 
not a unique area of study, covered by the McKinsey Global Institute (2004), 
IMF’s Bloom and Canning (2006), Magnus (2010), Arnott and Chaves 
(2012) among others. There are functional alternatives to this variable as a 
measure of the state of the economy, but the model pertaining to the 
explanatory variables’ influence aims to test hypotheses comparable to those 
present in previous research.  
 Empirical literature deliberated on in the first section suggested the 
inclusion of a variable to account for valuation effects and business cycles, a 
proxy variable for information that would otherwise be omitted, referring to 
public trading statistics as a feasible solution. The ECB provides an array of 
leading EU stock market indices, either taken directly from the market or 
synthesised via a long-lasting index such as Euro Stoxx 50. Whenever 
possible, this variable is supplemented with data from the member state stock 
market’s main index used for settlements, adjusted for breaks. The measure 
is not taken for countries lacking such an index during the analysed period. 
                                                          
1These draft models utilised broad age groups as defined by Eurostat (0-15, 16-64, 65 and 
over) or featured ad hoc grouping. 
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In case of multiple markets being present, as is the case in states such as 
Germany and France, data from the operator with the highest index 
capitalisation is selected. To reflect the measures taken in preparation of 
other variables, raw closing values of a year’s first trading session are 
converted into annualised percentage growth rates. The timing and 
magnitude are to match those of the demographic shares.  
 Dividend yields are cited as an alternative and a supplement to stock 
market indexes. However, these would be more challenging to use as an 
efficient measurement instrument in markets with endemic higher volatility, 
compounded by the fact that dividends are generally distributed several 
months after the end of the year in question. It generates a time lag, the 
length of which differs from country to country, that the market index does 
not have. Furthermore, indices in Western Europe have been dividend-
inclusive since as early as 1999. Adjusting pre-1999 values accordingly 
preserves the yield information while avoiding structural break.  
 As a proxy solution outside the financial market, the economy’s 
production function was considered. However, such a function’s estimation 
for every country in the sample would add complexity and reduce the 
number of degrees of freedom upon its inclusion in the regression.  
 Stationarity is often a question when dealing with demographic 
variables due to their susceptibility to time trends. The variables selected for 
analysis, i.e. the demographic shares, are held within an interval [0;1] and are 
taken from a sample of more than 20 countries experiencing different stages 
of the demographic transition, thus increasing the power of the tests, or, in 
case of economic variables, are presented in the form of annual percentage 
changes. 
 It is worth noting at this point the model’s primary goal is to examine 
dependencies rather than make predictions.  
 The EU’s changing composition poses another challenge of analysing 
dependencies in an all-inclusive fashion. Eurostat does not publish the 
aforementioned data for years prior to 2001 for newest members such as 
Romania and Croatia. Therefore, EU25 is the basis for the analysis. With 
regard to data availability, the model described in this part involves data 
from 1996 to 2013. 
 
Assessing the Effects of Demographic Trends in the European Union 
 In this part, we apply the model to analyse the effect of demographic 
shares on the annual percentage change in real GDP. The main results of the 
analysis are presented in Table. 
 The basis for the model is panel data containing the transformed age 
shares, represented by D1, D2 (x10), D3 (x100), D4 (x1000) between the 
years of 1996 and 2013 and the country’s main stock market index, lagged 
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by one period, represented by INDEX(1). The model includes fixed cross-
section effects to address signs of serial correlation. The measure is tested 
with the Redundant Fixed Effects test. As a secondary measure to tackle 
serial correlation, the values of GDP and INDEX, lagged by one period, are 
taken into account.  
 After making the steps described above, demographic share variables 
D3 and D4 do not appear statistically significant. To measure the order of the 
implied polynomial, we run the Wald coefficient restrictions test for both D3 
and D4. The probability of their redundancy is 0.13, which suggests their 
slope coefficients are statistically not dissimilar from naught at a 5 per cent 
significance level. Upon their removal from the regression, another iteration 
of the test run on D2 resulted in a probability of 0.018, which is enough to 
reject the null hypothesis at the same level of significance. This is in line 
with estimates obtained by Arnott and Chaves (2012) and the McKinsey 
Global Institute (2004). Disturbance variance is addressed by employing a 
White cross-section covariance matrix to obtain heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors.  
Table Independent Variables and their Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
C -4.2036 1.4846 -2.8314 0.0049 
D1 8.7571 3.6490 2.3998 0.0169 
D2 -5.8888 2.0869 -2.8217 0.0050 
INDEX(1) -0.0119 0.0028 -4.1982 0.0000 
GDP(1) 0.5117 0.0443 11.552 0.0000 
Source: Calculated by the authors 
 
 The res ult is a model with a determination coefficient of 0.68 and a 
Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.009. All variables included in the regression 
appear statistically significant at a 5 per cent significance level. By running 
the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test, we tested for AR(q) processes of 
orders up to 5. The obtained Chi-squared statistic did not exceed the critical 
value at the aforementioned significance level. 
 Multicollinearity may be considered an issue characteristic to 
demographic data in the presence of micronumerosity. However, the 
practical implications of multicollinearity in the model in question are 
lessened by the nature of the data undergoing analysis as D1 and D2, the 
affected variables, are calculated from the same source. Furthermore, 
removing one of the variables would result in a specification error we avoid 
by leaving both in the regression to be studied jointly. With this data, it is 
possible to derive the implied regression coefficients of each five-year age 
cohort. 
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 The implied regression coefficients of the original 18 age groups are 
reconstructed with the help of (3). They are regarded as such because the 
data pool was insufficiently large to generate the coefficients directly. The 
parabolic curve obtained (see Figure) should be read as follows: a 1 per cent 
increase in the share of the 30-34 age cohort in the population increases the 
annual growth rate of real GDP by 0.18 per cent. Likewise, an increase of 1 
per cent in the share of the 80-84 age cohort in the population decreases the 
annual growth rate of real GDP by 0.36 per cent. 
 
 
Figure. The Implied Regression Representation of Demographic Shares on Real GDP 
Growth. 
Source: Calculated by the authors 
 
 What we see in Figure is in line with economic logic as both pre-
adolescents and senior citizens in their retirement put pressure on growth 
while individuals of working age are the main contributors to real GDP 
growth, peaking at the age of 30-34, and dropping to zero at an age 
associated with retirement in parts of the EU. The insight obtained from 
Figure does not seem to contradict Life-cycle theory (LCT) assumptions. 
 The parabolic shape, the placement of the parabola’s maximum, 
points of crossing the horizontal axis appear similar to the estimates obtained 
by the McKinsey Global Institute (2004) as well as Arnott and Chaves 
(2012). While these studies are comparable methodologically, they take a set 
of different countries, spanning in a different time period, which ultimately 
leads to similar conclusions.  
 However, this examination reaffirms conclusions of previous 
research, namely that the past is not a prologue to the future. This occurs in 
out-of-sample robustness tests, on a set of countries not present in the 
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regression, in which the model fares poorly, with determination coefficients 
below 10 per cent. The fact that countries such as Croatia, the newest 
member state, or Moldova, an aspiring EU member, do not have a liquid 
stock market and publish a narrower array of statistical data contributes to 
the challenge of using the model for forecasting. Hence, the model’s 
theoretical contribution lies in providing a non-negative voice in the study of 
the relationship between demographic variables and the economy as a whole.  
 In practice, this paper gives policymakers a framework encompassing 
each five-year age group’s net contribution to the economy. This 
encompasses the cohorts exhibiting a negative effect on real GDP growth, 
namely, those under the age of 10 and above the age of 64. Pinpointing the 
sources of dampened growth and quantifying their magnitude may have 
potential utility in the long term, be it a reform of parenthood and related 
social aid on the left side of the age spectrum or improvements of the 
pension system, which would tackle the right-hand side. Since an increase in 
the relative weight of groups on both ends of the age pyramid would have a 
negative effect on real GDP growth, given the circumstances do not change, 
EU member states should focus on the risks posed by an ageing society.  
 There are several non-exclusive ways of addressing the issue, based 
on Figure. Since it is unreasonable to assume a reduction in the relative 
weight of groups above the age of 64 in the current state of affairs without an 
increase in the weight of the previous groups, the straightforward solutions 
involves such an increase. Depending on the state of public finances, 
encouraging parenthood in an attempt to dilute the relative weight of those 
aged 65 and over and boost future growth may not be a functional alternative 
due to real GDP costs associated with the negative effect of the first two 
five-year age groups. It limits the possibility of using local resources to 
mitigate the negative effects. However, turning to non-EU countries, an 
outside source, as a means of stimulating real GDP growth via immigration 
may entail different costs despite being an attractive solution on the surface. 
 Another possible solution refers to limitations in forecasting long-
term changes in demographic variables: the past not being a prologue to the 
future. Changes over time in the way different demographic shares affect the 
economy may preclude the need for making a conscious policy effort in 
altering the demographic makeup of a population. The solution entails 
influencing behavioural patterns to pushing the null points further apart on 
the horizontal axis, which may be a point in favour of encouraging prolonged 
activity in the economy and reach the spending phase in LCT at a later age. 
 While the challenges policymakers face in the event of continuous 
demographic transformations are distinguishable largely thanks to the 
macroeconomic nature of real GDP growth-oriented legislation, such 
changes pose a different question to the private sector equipped with a 
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limited set of tools. This quality outlines the importance of effective dialogue 
between the parties involved, but it does not bar the potential usefulness of 
private initiatives. 
 As the EU ages, an increased pool of time series data may help in 
further contributing to this analysis. Alternatively, limiting the sample of 
countries to states where data has been available since at least 1950 may 
provide greater accuracy for the use in the relevant region, leaving newer 
member states unassessed. Collating countries with established statistical 
authorities upon considering their key structural differences is another 
alternative in order to reach a long-term conclusion with plausibly greater 
predictive power necessitating further research.  
 Finally, the paper provides an EU-centric voice in an American-
dominated discussion. It is a study encompassing a number of member 
states, taking into account the longest period possible for joint analysis of all 
five-year age groups. While it highlights similarities between the 
demographic challenges faced by the EU and the USA in comparable 
studies, it also presents an outlook from a different socioeconomic 
perspective in an environment that encourages governments to review their 
commitments to national pension systems. The importance of dialogue 
during a period of uncertainty is further maintained by providing a platform 
for subsequent research. Either utilising alternative macroeconomic 
indicators or slicing results into smaller regional clusters, there are numerous 
possibilities to further our understanding of the effects of demographic trends 
on the economy and financial markets. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The on-going debate about the relationship between demographic and 
economic variables produced a body of academic work during the last 20 
years. American research dedicated to the study of the Baby Boomer 
phenomenon in the USA has made a significant contribution to the 
discussion. Despite increasing interest in the topic, there is no consensus 
regarding the properties or existence of a transmission mechanism with 
different studies reaching opposite conclusions. 
 Research spearheaded by both policymakers and private initiatives 
highlights the shared nature of concerns related to changes in a population’s 
demographic makeup. From social services to securities markets, steps were 
taken to analyse the underlying processes from the point of view of a number 
of industries, governments and international institutions. 
 Long-term estimates about the effects of demographic trends on the 
economy in academic literature are frequently based on a plethora of 
behavioural assumptions, making them susceptible to being altered in the 
presence of shocks. It limits the utility of currently available models. 
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 In this paper, an attempt to analyse the effect of demographic 
transformations in the EU on the annual percentage change of real GDP has 
been made, thus adding a voice to the relevant academic debate. The 
proposed force-fitted polynomial model with fixed country cross-section 
effects has noted a statistically significant non-linear relationship between 
EU member states’ demographic shares and annual growth of real GDP at a 
5 per cent significance level. The fixed cross-section effects outlined inter-
EU differences not caught by quantitative variables. 
 The model’s findings did not reject LCT stipulations outright, with 
age groups pertaining to the period prior and after participation in the labour 
force putting pressure on the analysed economic variables. Conversely, the 
period associated with participation in the labour force exhibited a contrary 
effect. 
 Robustness of the calculated effect of each demographic share 
depended on the use of a sufficiently long period of time with formal 
variable restrictions in order to display the relationship between the slow 
evolution of a population’s demographic composition and the underlying 
regressand. Robustness tests outlined the issue of predictability with the use 
of demographic shares: the models exhibited low precision, confirming their 
intended utility as an instrument for studying dependencies rather than 
forecasting. This property was also noted in comparable third party research. 
 While the lack of reliable long-term data makes progress in studying 
the effects of demographic trends in certain new member states of the EU 
slow, the conclusions reached by the authors as well as those in cited 
comparable research regarding the functional form of dependencies point to 
the possibility of period of underwhelming GDP growth. This, in turn, casts 
a doubt on the long-term sustainability of the social security system that is 
currently in place. 
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